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CONTRACT FORMULATION UNDER
ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
CAROLYN M. EDWARDS*
Today, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code' is the
principal statute governing sales of goods2 in every state except
Louisiana. Although the article made fundamental changes in
the law of sales, it did not totally displace common law princi-
ples. Indeed, some provisions of the statute codify common law
rules. The shortcoming of the statute, however, is that it is not
self-executing; it is silent on some issues and ambiguous as to
others. Under these circumstances courts have resorted to com-
mon law, citing Article 1, section 1-103,1 which provides that
the principles of law and equity may supplement the Code
unless such principles are displaced by particular provisions.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A. Wells Col-
lege, 1964; J.D. University of Toledo, 1970.
1. U.C.C. (1972). The 1962 and 1972 versions of Article 2 are identical with the
exception of U.C.C. § 2-107 which was amended in 1972.
2. Article 2 applies to transactions in goods. U.C.C. § 2-102. Goods are defined in
U.C.C. § 2-105 as
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.
"Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (Section 2-107).
The term "transaction" is not defined, but it is now clear that the term has broader
application than to the traditional true sale. For an analysis of the reach of Article 2
principles into a variety of subjects including leases of real estate and service contracts,
see Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447 (1971).
3. U.C.C. § 1-103 reads: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supple-
ment its provisions."
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This article is an examination of the principles of offer and
acceptance for the formation of the sales contract4 as estab-
lished in sections 2-204, 2-205, 2-206 and 2-207 of the Code and
an outline of the common law rules preserved either through
codification or incorporation via section 1-103. In making this
examination it is at once apparent that the Code leaves many
issues unanswered.
The question arises whether courts should incorporate com-
mon law principles in existence at the time the Code was
adopted or common law principles that were subsequently de-
veloped by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. This ques-
tion, which is discussed in the paragraphs that follow, is com-
plicated by certain factors. First, Article 2 rejects some of the
common law rules of offer and acceptance and creates new
principles which the drafters thought were more consistent
with modern business practices.5 Second, although many of the
common law rules of offer and acceptance have remained un-
changed over time, others have changed significantly under the
influence of Article 2.1
4. U.C.C. § 2-301, which provides that "[t]he obligation of the seller is to transfer
and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract,"
makes it clear that the law of sales is based on the law of contracts.
5. "Article 2-Sales, of the Uniform Commercial Code may very well be called 'the
businessman's article.' It attacks, for the first time, many of the technical rules of
contract law whose application has disappointed the reasonable expectations and frus-
trated the intentions of the businessman in commercial transactions." Davenport,
How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and
Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAW. 75 (1963). Although
many of the Article 2 sections were drafted for the purpose of modernizing existing
business law, the article applies to both merchants and nonmerchants. It does, how-
ever, contain thirteen sections which are applicable only to merchants. The term
"merchant" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) to mean:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attrib-
uted by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
See also Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FIA. L. REV.
367 (1957).
6. The authors of the second Restatement are primarily responsible for the develop-
ment of the new common law rules for the formation of contracts. The influence of
Article 2 on the Restatement (Second) is clear. Compare, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206 with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 29, 31 & 63 (1973).
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THE OFFER
Common Law
The common law has always recognized that a contract is
formed by the manifestation of mutual assent. In other words,
it is the expression of the parties' intent through words and
conduct as understood by a reasonable person that is control-
ling. The actual or secret intent of the parties is immaterial.7
Assent usually takes the form of an offer made by one person,
the offeror, and an acceptance by the other, the offeree.5
An offer is defined as a promise which requests perform-
ance, forbearance or a promise as an exchange.' The promise
need not be expressed in words, but may be communicated by
conduct. 0 As a promise, the offer is a commitment made by the
offeror of future action or inaction."
To determine whether the requisite intent to make an offer
exists, a number of factors are considered, including the terms
used in the proposal, its subject matter, the relationship of the
parties and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 2 If
7. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383,
105 S.W. 777 (1907); Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954). The classic
statement of the objective standard was made by Judge Learned Hand in Hotchkiss
v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911):
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by mere force of law
to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and
represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that
either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual
meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there
were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
8. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §
22 (1973).
9. The first Restatement defined an offer as a "promise which is in its terms
conditional upon an act, forbearance, or return promise being given in exchange for
the promise or its performance." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1932). The second
Restatement modifies this rule on the ground that an offer may be an offer of a
performance, to be exchanged either for a return promise or a return performance. It
defines an offer as "the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made
as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited
and will conclude it." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1973).
10. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 5 & 21 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 5 & 21 (1973). See, e.g., Feinberg v. Automobile Banking Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Butler v. Solomon, 127 Conn. 613, 18 A.2d 685 (1941).
11. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
2 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1941); Nickel v. Theresa Farmers Coop. Ass'n., 247 Wis. 412, 20 N.W.2d 117 (1945).
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intent to make an offer is not established, the proposal merely
constitutes preliminary negotiations, a statement of future in-
tent or an invitation to deal. Such a proposal does not confer
upon the party to whom it is made the legal power of accept-
ance.
The Code
Article 2 continues the principle that the essential element
in the formation of a contract is objective mutual assent ex-
pressed through an offer and an acceptance. 3 Such assent may
be communicated through words or conduct. 4 Although the
term "offer" is used in three sections of Article 2," it is not
defined and courts have resorted to the common law definition.
The fact that Article 2 does not define the term "offer" is not
surprising. The concept of an offer as a promise or commitment
of future action or inaction is fundamental to contract law. It
is a concept which cannot be changed. The failure to define the
term merely indicates the drafters' intention to maintain this
traditional concept. 8
The Code also continues the view of the common law that
the presence or absence of intent to contract is to be deter-
mined by the consideration of various factors including the
language used in the proposals and the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction. 7 However, at pre-Code law, if all
For an extensive discussion of the factors which are used to determine whether a
proposal constitutes an offer, see J. MuAY, CoNRAcTS § 24 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
13. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides that the term "agreement" means "the bargain of
the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstan-
ces including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided
in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208)." U.C.C. § 1-201(11) states that "'contract'
means the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected
by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." See, e.g., Bradford v. Plains Cotton
Coop. Ass'n., 539 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1976); Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr.,
Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Hawaii 1975); Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531,
369 A.2d 1017 (1977).
14. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) provides that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract." The comment observes that the purpose
of subsection (1) is to continue the basic policy of recognizing any manner of expression
of agreement, oral, written or otherwise.
15. U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-206 & 2-207.
16. See, e.g., Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 369 A.2d 1017
(1977) (defining an offer as a promise).
17. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3) & 1-201(11). In addition, U.C.C. §§ 1-205 and 2-208 specifi-
cally provide for the relevance of course of performance, course of dealing and usage
of trade.
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material terms1 8 were not included in the proposal, the courts
were reluctant to conclude that the requisite intent to make an
offer existed. This reluctance extended to proposals which pro-
vided that the parties would agree in the future on essential
terms. Such agreements to agree, it was said, indicated a lack
of present intent to be bound and were therefore unemforce-
able.19
This pre-Code view was troublesome, particularly as it ap-
plied to business transactions. Indefiniteness in such transac-
tions may occur in one of several ways. Frequently, parties
arrive at an agreement in a piecemeal fashion and after a
lengthy series of negotiations. Although the parties intend to
be bound, they inadvertently fail to specify all terms. In addi-
tion, it is not unusual for parties not to specify essential terms,
such as price, at the time the agreement is made because per-
formance is to occur in the distant future. Under these circum-
stances, they do not want to be bound in the future by terms
established at the time of contracting. It is also common in
some industries that the parties are not able at the time of
entering into an agreement to set all terms. It is understood by
them that the terms will be established according to prevailing
industry standards during the performance of the agreement.
The Code recognizes business realities and rejects the strict
common law view. Subsection 2-204(3) provides that a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have in-
See, e.g., Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (contracts in steel importing business often made over telephone); Bornstein v.
Somerson, 341 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1977) (agreements with one or more terms left open
are common in citrus industry); Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 540 P.2d
978 (Hawaii 1975) (course of dealing between the parties evidenced an intention to
treat price quotation as an offer); Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531,
369 A.2d 1017 (1977) (letter viewed with reference to method of operation of the con-
struction industry and prior course of dealings was an offer); Realty Dev., Inc. v.
Kosydar, 67 Ohio Op. 2d 67, 322 N.E.2d 328 (1974) (consistent with commercial prac-
tice to conclude vendee made offer).
18. Material terms include price, quantity, quality, time and place for delivery,
and time of payment.
19. Smith v. Chickamauga Cedar Co., 263 Ala. 245, 82 So. 2d 200 (1955) (agree-
ment to furnish logs in quantity deemed "feasible and economical"); Willmott v.
Giarraputo, 5 N.Y.2d 250, 184 N.Y.S.2d 97, 157 N.E.2d 282 (1959) (agreement that
"the payment of interest and amortization of principal shall be mutually agreed upon
at the time of entering into a more formal contract"); Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y.
223, 111 N.E. 822 (1916) (promise to pay "a fair share of my profits"). For a detailed
textbook discussion of the problem of indefiniteness at pre-Code law, see J. MURRAY,
CONTRACTS § 27 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
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tended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy."0 Thus, the fact that
one or more essential terms is missing or is to be agreed upon
in the future will not inevitably signify lack of intent. Indefi-
niteness is one factor to be considered in conjunction with oth-
ers. The comment to the section adds that commercial stan-
dards on the point of "indefiniteness" are intended to be ap-
plied. That is, the nature and commercial needs of the industry
involved must be taken into consideration in determining
whether a proposal which does not include all material terms
nevertheless manifests intent to be bound. Accordingly, an
agreement void for "indefiniteness" in one factual context may
be adequate in another.2 '
Termination of the Power of Acceptance
Once it is established that an offer has come into existence
and that the power of acceptance has been created, the ques-
tion becomes one of determining what events terminate this
power. At pre-Code law, the most common events were the
counteroffer, rejection, lapse of time, revocation and death of
either party. 2 Revocation did not end the power of acceptance
until it was received by the offeree. 23 It could be manifested
20. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) provides: "Even though one or more terms are left open a
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." An
extensive list of cases is cited in 3 M. BENDER, U.C.C. SERVICE § 3.03(1) (1975).
Article 2 contains a number of sections which fill in the gaps which the parties have
left open. Clearly the most important section is U.C.C. § 2-305 (open price term).
Others include U.C.C. § 2-306 (output, requirements and exclusive dealing agree-
ments); U.C.C. § 2-307 (delivery in single lots or several lots); U.C.C. § 2-308 (absence
of specified time for delivery); U.C.C. § 2-309 (absence of specific time provisions;
notice of termination); U.C.C. § 2-310 (open time for payment); and U.C.C. § 2-311
(options and cooperation respecting performance).
21. In Bornstein v. Somerson, 341 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1977) the court noted that
"[despite its common use, this Purchase Agreement and Contract could, in another
factual context, be held void for indefiniteness. . . . We would suggest that the nature
of the citrus industry requires many factors to be left open in sales contracts for future
crops." Id. at 1048 n.10. See also Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784
(5th Cir. 1975) (despite open terms, contract conforms to acceptable practice in the
cotton trade). The comments to U.C.C. § 2-204 also state that the more terms the
parties fail to include, the less likely it is that they intend to be bound.
22. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 35 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 35 (1973). Other less common means of terminating the power of acceptance are
incapacity of the offeror and nonoccurrence of any condition of acceptance under the
terms of the offer.
23. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 41 (1932). See, e.g., Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 5
C.P.D. 344 (1880); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (1973).
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directly to the offeree or indirectly as where the offer was for
the sale of an interest in real or personal property and the
offeree before exercising the power of acceptance received relia-
ble information that the offeror had sold or contracted to sell
the interest to another.24 Similarly, a rejection or counteroffer
terminated the offeree's power of acceptance only upon receipt
by the offeree.2 Death of the offeror, on the other hand, ended
the power of acceptance without notice to the offeree. 21
The Code, with one exception, does not attempt to specify
these events. The exception is section 2-207, which applies
whenever a response to an offer does not comply exactly with
the terms of the offer. This section is discussed below. How-
ever, it should be observed at this point that section 2-207 does
not eliminate the possibility that a response to an offer which
varies the terms of the offer will create a counteroffer. Thus,
in Article 2 transactions, courts must resort to common law to
determine what events terminate the power of acceptance and
the point in time such events are effective. These principles
have remained substantially unchanged over time,"7 and
whether courts resort to pre-Code or post-Code statements of
the rules will not generally affect the conclusion drawn on a
particular question.
THE FIRM OFFER
It is not unexpected that the drafters did not alter, with the
exception of section 2-207, the common law rules relating to the
events which terminate the power of acceptance. Such rules are
known within the business community and operate in most
circumstances without producing harsh results. However, fre-
quently in business transactions, the offeror promises to keep
24. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1932). See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dodds, Court
of Appeal, 2 Ch. D 463 (1876). The draftsmen of the second Restatement have extended
the scope of this section as follows: "An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated
when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the
proposed contract and offeree acquires reliable information to that effect."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1973).
25. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 39 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 39 (1973).
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 48 (1932). Section 48 of the second Restatement
preserves the rule, although comment a observes, "This rule seems to be a relic of the
obsolete view that a contract requires a 'meeting of minds' and it is out of harmony
with the modern doctrine that a manifestation of assent is effective without regard to
actual mental assent."
27. But see note 24, supra.
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his offer open. The classical common law view was that such a
promise was not enforceable against the offeror in the absence
of consideration and the offeror could withdraw the offer at any
time prior to acceptance.18
The drafters recognized that the common law rule was ine-
quitable because it could cause the offeree hardship.29 Section
2-205 was created to remedy the situation."0 The comments3' to
this section suggest that its purpose is to give effect to the
deliberate intention of a merchant to make binding his assur-
ance to keep the offer open. Several points about this section
should be observed.
The section does not attempt to define the term "offer" but
presupposes that an offer has been made.32 The offer must be
made by a merchant.33 Unfortunately, in some instances, this
term has been a troublesome one to apply,34 and it may be
expected to create some uncertainty in the application of sec-
tion 2-205. The offer may be made either to a merchant or to a
nonmerchant.
The offer must be in a signed writing35 and contain an assur-
28. See, e.g., Hummer v. Engeman, 206 Va. 102, 141 S.E.2d 716 (1965).
29. See Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales: Should It Be Enacted? 59
YALE L.J. 821 (1950).
30. U.C.C. § 2-205 provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months;
but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be
separately signed by the offeror.
An option contract may also be created pursuant to Restatement (Second) § 45
when the offeree tenders or begins performance, or pursuant to Restatement (Second)
§ 89(B)(2) when the offeree substantially and foreseeably relied on the offer. See text
accompanying notes 79 to 99, infra.
31. U.C.C. § 2-205, comment 1.
32. See, e.g., Realty Dev., Inc. v. Kosydar, 67 Ohio Op. 2d 67, 322 N.E.2d 328
(1974) (where evidence was susceptible to the interpretation that quotation was merely
invitation to make offer; burden not sustained of proving quotation to be a firm offer).
33. For the definition of a merchant, see U.C.C. § 2-104(1), note 5 supra. See also
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (1964) (section 2-205
held inapplicable to offer of a trust company acting as a trustee of stock for the reason,
among others, that the company is not a merchant).
34. For extensive discussion on the application of the term "merchant" to farmers,
see Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Is the Farmer a "Merchant"? 28 BAYLOR L. Rv.
715 (1976). See also Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965)
(farmer is not a merchant); Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 27 N.C. App. 689, 220
S.E.2d 361 (1975) (farmer is a merchant).
35. An oral offer which contains a promise to keep the offer open is not within the
[Vol. 61:215
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ance that it will be held open.36 The writing which contains the
assurance may also be on a form supplied by the offeree. How-
ever, to protect the offeror from inadvertently signing such a
term, it is necessary that the clause be called to the offeror's
attention and that he separately authenticate it.31 The pur-
pose of the signature is to indicate the deliberate intention of
the merchant to make the offer irrevocable whether that sig-
nature is contained on the offeror's own form or one supplied
by the offeree. A formal signature is not always required,
however, to establish the requisite intent. "Signed" also
includes authentication, which could consist of the initialing
of the clause involved.3 8
The option lasts for the time stated or, if no time is stated,
for a reasonable time. However, in no event does the period of
irrevocability exceed three months.39 If the parties stipulate a
period longer than three months, the option is ineffective for
the time exceeding the three months. The comments," how-
ever, recognize that the option may be renewed although it is
unclear whether the renewal date commences to run for the
time of renewal or from the end of the original period. The three
month time period may not be satisfactory to parties who at
scope of the section and may be withdrawn unless the promise is supported by consid-
eration. U.C.C. § 2-205, comment 2 states: "However, despite settled courses of dealing
or usages of the trade whereby firm offers are made by oral communication and relied
upon without more evidence, such offers remain revocable under this Article since
authentication by a writing is the essence of this section."
36. The cases suggest that the term "assurance" has not created the difficulties
that were predicted when Article 2 first appeared. See, e.g., 3 M. BENDER, U.C.C.
SERVICE § 4.03(2) (1975) which states that
as time goes on, there will undoubtedly be contest over the qualification of
various language under the requirement that it "give assurance." An offer recit-
ing that it is "open," "will remain open," or that "this is firm" should qualify.
But whether such language as "For a twenty day period we will sell to you.
is sufficient is less clear.
There have been very few cases to date which have involved U.C.C. § 2-205. In none
of them has a difficult interpretation issue of language arisen. See, e.g., E.A. Coronis
Assoc. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966) wherein the
court rejected Ithe contention that the language "We are pleased to offer. .. " created
a firm offer.
37. U.C.C. § 2-205, comment 4.
38. U.C.C. § 2-205, comment 2.
39. Neither the section nor the comments suggest how the time period is to be
computed when a specified period (e.g., 30 days) is provided for the offer to remain
open. The ambiguity may be avoided by the parties if the assurance includes a specific
date and time at which the option is to terminate.
40. U.C.C. § 2-205, comment 3.
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the time the offer is made wish to establish a longer period.
The question arises as to whether in such an event, the
merchant-offeror and offeree may use the common law firm
offer or option contract supported by consideration. At com-
mon law, the firm offer supported by consideration remained
effective against the parties for as long as the parties specified.
The comments4' to section 2-205 suggest that the section was
not intended to pre-empt this traditional common law device
in transactions involving a merchant-offeror. It is thus avail-
able for use by the merchant-offeror and the offeree in the
event they wish the period of irrevocability to exceed three
months. In addition, since section 2-205 is applicable only
when the offer is made by a merchant, nonmerchants must
resort to the common law firm offer supported by consideration
to create an irrevocable offer.42
THE ACCEPTANCE
The offer creates the power of acceptance in the offeree. The
exercise of that power according to the terms of the offer consti-
tutes the acceptance and is the manifestation of assent re-
quired to create the contractual relationship." Article 2 has two
principal sections which establish rules of acceptance.44 The
41. At common law, the power of acceptance under an option contract is not termi-
nated by rejection, counteroffer, revocation or by death or incapacity of the offeror
unless the requirements are met for the discharge of a contractual duty. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 35A (1973). The Code is silent on the question of whether
the power of acceptance under a firm offer made pursuant to section 2-205 is termi-
nated by any of these events. It is submitted that the answer should be in the negative.
42. The application of the section to situations other than those where the assur-
ance is contained in a written signed offer or on a form supplied by the offeree is not
clear. For instance, an oral offer which includes a promise to keep the offer open and
is subsequently confirmed in a signed writing which includes the assurance should
satisfy the statute. An assurance in a signed writing which is made after the offer has
been made should also be binding. In each case, the merchant has deliberately in-
tended to make the offer irrevocable, inducing reliance by the offeree. The fact that
the section's technical requirements are not met should not, it is submitted, preclude
a finding that the offeror is bound.
43. Acceptance is defined by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 52(1)
(1973) as the "manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a
manner invited or required by the offer." But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 55 (1973).
44. According to early common law rules, a contract came into existence at a
determinable moment in time. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) modifies this rule. It provides: "An
agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the
moment of its making is undetermined." The comment explains that this subsection
is directed primarily to the case where the correspondence exchanged between parties
[Vol. 61:215
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first is section 2-206 which is concerned with the manner" and
medium of acceptance. The second is section 2-207 which
applies whenever the response to an offer does not correspond
exactly to the terms of the offer. These two sections will be
discussed separately in the paragraphs that follow. In each
instance, it is necessary to briefly outline the common law rules
in existence at the time Article 2 was drafted. Such an outline
will provide a more complete understanding of the Code sec-
tions and the reasons for the drafters' rejection of certain com-
mon law rules.
Common Law
At common law, the offeror was considered the master of his
offer. He could prescribe in what manner and by what medium
the power of acceptance was to be exercised. With respect to
manner, the common law rule was that the offeror bargained
for either a return promise as acceptance or for performance or
forbearance. If the offeror bargained for a return promise, the
giving of the return promise by the offeree created a bilateral
contract. The promise did not have to be expressed in words,
but could be communicated by conduct" and even by silence
in some circumstances.48 If the offeror bargained for perform-
ance or forbearance, the completion of the requested perform-
ance or forbearance created a unilateral contract. The distinc-
tion between unilateral and bilateral contracts was fundamen-
tal in that an attempt by the offeree to accept in a manner
other than that prescribed by the offer did not bind the offeror.
If the offeror bargained for performance or forbearance, a re-
turn promise was ineffective as an acceptance. If the offeror
requested a return promise and the offeree performed or tend-
ered performance without making the promise, such perform-
ance or tender was ineffective as an acceptance unless it was
completed during the period allowed for accepting by return
does not disclose the exact moment at which the deal was closed but actions of the
parties make it clear that an obligation was intended and has been undertaken.
45. Manner refers to the requested performance, forebearance or promise to be
given in exchange for the offer.
46. Medium refersto the means of transmission used to communicate the accept-
ance.
47. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 5 & 21 (1932). See, e.g., Wood & Brooks Co. v.
D.E. Hewitt Lumber Co., 89 W. Va. 254, 109 S.E. 242 (1921).
48. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 72 (1932).
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promise.49 It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a uni-
lateral or a bilateral contract was invited since offers are fre-
quently ambiguous. Common law presumed, therefore, that an
offer requested a bilateral contract .5  This presumption was
adopted because the bilateral contract immediately and fully
protected both parties since each is bound upon the giving of
the return promise by the offeree. 1
Where performance or forbearance constituted the accept-
ance, notice from the offeree that he had completed the re-
quested performance or forbearance was not generally re-
quired.12 Two exceptions, however, were recognized. The first
was created when the offeror requested notice. The second ex-
ception arose where the offeror had no adequate means of as-
certaining with reasonable promptness and certainty that the
performance or forbearance had taken place. Under these cir-
cumstances, the offeree was under a duty to exercise reasonable
diligence to notify the offeror.55 Failure to provide notice dis-
charged the duty of the offeror. That is, notice was not essential
to create the contract, but lack of notice discharged the of-
feror's duty.54 The rule that mandatory notice did not consti-
tute a part of the acceptance was based on the view that the
offeror had bargained for acts, not words, and that therefore the
contract came into existence upon completion of the perform-
ance.
Where the offeror looked forward to a bilateral contract,
notice of acceptance by the offeree was required55 except if the
offeror dispensed with it or under the circumstances the of-
feree's silence or inaction constituted acceptance. The re-
quirement that notice be given was based on the view that a
promise involves communication. Notice was therefore consid-
49. Id. at § 63.
50. Id. at § 31. 1 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 60 (3d ed. 1957). See, e.g., Davis v.
Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y.
88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
51. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 31, comment a (1932).
52. Id. at § 56. See, e.g., Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) 1 Q.B. 256.
53. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 56 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 69 (3d ed.
1957).
54. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 56, comment a (1932). A mih1ority view which has
been applied to guaranties of future advances is that notice constitutes a part of the
acceptance. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 69A (3d ed. 1957).
55. See, e.g., Lloyd & Elliott, Inc. v. Parke, 114 Conn. 12, 157 A. 272 (1931); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 70 (Sd ed. 1957).
56. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 72 (1932).
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ered an essential part of the acceptance and was effective only
upon receipt by the offeror.
In time, however, the courts developed the rule, commonly
referred to as the "mailbox rule"5 that in cases where an ac-
ceptance was sent by mail or otherwise from a distance, the
acceptance was effective on dispatch, provided it was properly
addressed58 and was sent by the medium stipulated or, in the
absence of a stipulated medium, by an authorized medium. 9
If the offeree used means of transmission which were not au-
thorized, the acceptance was effective on receipt provided it
was received by the offeror within the time in which an accept-
ance sent in an authorized manner would have been received. 60
The traditional view was that revocation or withdrawal of
the offer by the offeror could occur at any time before accept-
ance took place.' Where the offer looked forward to a bilateral
contract, the power to revoke terminated when the offeree com-
municated the return promise to the offeror or in cases where
the mailbox rule applied, the instant the acceptance was dis-
patched, provided the acceptance was properly addressed and
authorized means of transmission were used.62 If an unauthor-
ized medium was employed, the power to revoke ceased at the
instant the acceptance was received.63 The principle that the
offer could be revoked before acceptance could create hardship
for the offeree where a unilateral contract was requested. Since
the offeror had bargained for a completed act and was therefore
entitled to receive it, the traditional view was that the power
to revoke continued up to the point that the act was complete. 4"
In time, courts developed theories65 to justify the view that the
57. Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (1818). This result
obtains even if the acceptance does not arrive at its destination. See, e.g., Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Wheeler, 114 Okla. 161, 245 P. 39 (1926).
58. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 67 (1932).
59. The first Restatement defined authorized medium as that medium used by the
offeror or that medium customary in similar transactions at the time when and the
place where the offer is received. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 66 (1932).
60. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 68 (1932).
61. Id. § 41.
62. See note 57, supra.
63. RESTATEMENT OF. CONTRAcTS §§ 41 & 68 (1932).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Cauthen, 98 Miss. 746, 54 So. 844 (1911); Stensgaard v.
Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N.W. 669 (1890); Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 685, 5 S.E. 193 (1888).
65. One such view was to hold that a bilateral contract arises when the offeree
starts to perform. Seee.g., Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 P.
1086 (1902); Wright v. Mary Galloway Home for Aged Women, 186 Miss. 197, 187 So.
752 (1939).
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offeror's power terminated upon the start of performance. The
first Restatement of Contracts justified this view on the theory
that the main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessar-
ily implied, that if part of the requested performance is given
or tendered, the offeror will not revoke his offer. Part perform-
ance or tender furnished consideration for the subsidiary prom-
ise and thereby created an option contract which bound only
the offeror. The offeree was not bound to complete perform-
ance. The offeror's duty to perform was conditional, however,
upon the completion of the requested forbearance or perform-
ance by the offeree.66
Thus, pursuant to section 45 of the first Restatement, the
giving of part performance or tender of the requested exchange
created an option contract which terminated the offeror's
power to revoke. In theory and effect, it was similar to the firm
offer supported by consideration. Its scope of application was
more limited, however, in that it applied only to the offer for a
unilateral contract. The firm offer, on the other hand, was
applicable to offers which looked forward to either a unilateral
or bilateral contract. In time, a new method of creating an
irrevocable offer was recognized. The first Restatement
adopted the principle of promissory estoppel in section 90.17
Traditionally, this principle was applied to make only gratui-
tous promises enforceable, but in time the courts held that an
offer was made irrevocable by substantial action in reliance if
that action was such that the offeror had reason to foresee it
as a result of his offer. Reliance usually took the form of prepa-
rations to perform the required exchange. 8 Such reliance did
not have to be part of the bargained for consideration. It must
Another theory used in cases in which a series of acts were requested was to construe
the offer as bargaining for the initial act as the acceptance. The subsequent acts were
then construed to be conditions precedent to the offeror's duty to perform. See, e.g.,
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917).
A third view was to construe the offer in cases of doubt as an offer for a bilaterial
contract. See, e.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934).
66. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). See, e.g., Marchiondo v. Scheck, 78
N.M. 440, 432 P.2d 405 (1967).
67. Section 90 of the first Restatement provides: "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
68. One of the first and most influential cases to apply promissory estoppel in a
construction bidding context to an offer which had induced reliance was Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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be observed, however, that this use of promissory estoppel was
not widely accepted at first. Traditionally, it was presumed
that the function of contract law was to protect the expecta-
tions of the parties. The notion that detrimental reliance was
a protected interest was new to contract law and viewed with
scepticism. In time, the scepticism would disappear.9
The Code
The Code was introduced when these traditional rules of
acceptance prevailed. Although the Code continues the rule
that acceptance must objectively manifest intent to contract,"
it does make dramatic changes in the principles of acceptance.
These changes were made in response to the criticism of the
common law classification of contracts into two categories, uni-
lateral and bilateral,71 and the rule that for an acceptance to
be effective, it must mirror the terms of the offer. In changing
the common law rules, the Code has discarded the terms uni-
lateral and bilateral and substituted "performance" or
"promise" to describe the manner of acceptance. 72
Section 2-20671 provides principles of acceptance which are
69. The applicability of promissory estoppel to construction bidding cases has
found increasing acceptance. See, e.g., Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp.,
493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1974) (construing Missouri law); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.N.K. Transit
Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220 (1972); Wargo Builders, Inc. v. Douglas L.
Cox Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 26 Ohio App. 2d 1, 268 N.E.2d 597 (1971). See also
Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YMSL .J. 343
(1969).
70. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hughes, 276 Md. 247, 346 A.2d 231 (1975) (fact that
purchaser-offeree thought the contract was still being negotiated and that he had a
subjective but unexpressed desire to impose conditions on the terms of payment irrele-
vant in face of objective manifestation of assent). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 55 (1973).
71. Llewellyn, On Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance 1, 48 YAIE L.J.
1779 (1939).
72. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206.
73. U.C.C. § 2-206 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circum-
stances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance
in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to
ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-
conforming goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods does not
constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that
the shipment is offered orily as an accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of
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applicable to most transactions involving sales of goods. Unfor-
tunately, the provision is ambiguous and confusing because it
is subject to numerous interpretations. At this point one obser-
vation about interpretation should be made. It has been sug-
gested that the terms "manner" or "medium" contained in
section 2-206(1)(a) are identical in meaning and refer to the
means of transmission used to communicate the acceptance.
This interpretation is supported by the first comment to the
section. It is the only comment74 which attempts to explain
section 2-206(1) (a) and refers solely to the question of whether
an acceptace made by correspondence must be communicated
by the same means of transmission as that used by the offeror.
The second and broader interpretation is that medium refers
to the means of transmission while manner refers to the re-
quested performance or promise.
Assuming the broad interpretation is adopted, the introduc-
tory phrase suggests that manner or medium75 may be stipu-
lated either by language contained in the offer or by circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. If the language or sur-
rounding circumstances are ambiguous, section 2-206(1)(a)
provides that the offeree may choose to accept in any reasona-
ble manner and by any reasonable medium. In recognizing that
the offeror is entitled to insist on a particular manner or me-
dium, the Code retains the common law principle that the
offeror is master of his offer.
acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time
may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
74. U.C.C. § 2-206, comment 1. It should also be observed that section 2-206(2)
refers to "mode of acceptance" in describing performance. The term "mode" is not
used in section 2-206(1). It might be suggested, therefore, that the term "manner" does
not refer to the bargained-for performance or promise but is identical in meaning to
the term "medium." This suggestion supports the narrow interpretation.
75. In addition to medium, the offeror may also prescribe other aspects of the power
of acceptance, including time and place. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 61
(1973). It is not unusual in business transactions, for instance, for the offer or order to
expressly stipulate that it is not binding on the principal until accepted by him. See,
e.g., Antonucci v. Stevens Dodge, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 173, 340 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1973) (offer
contained statement that the offer would not become binding until accepted by the
dealer or his authorized representative, acceptance to be signified by the signature of
the dealer, the dealer's manager or other authorized signature). Such statements may,
however, merely constitute suggestions which do not preclude other reasonable means
of acceptance. See, e.g., McAfee v. Brewer, 214 Va. 579, 203 S.E.2d 129 (1974) (offer
calling for acceptance by return of a signed copy of the offer did not preclude accept-
ance by letter).
[Vol. 61:215
CONTRACT FORMATION
The broad interpretation constitutes a radical change of
pre-existing rules. As observed above, at pre-Code law, the
offeror was viewed as bargaining for either a return promise or
for performance. In cases of doubt it was presumed that a bilat-
eral contract was intended. The broad interpretation, which
gives the offeree the opportunity to choose the manner of ac-
ceptance in the event manner is not prescribed, is consistent,
however, with business expectations. Therefore, it is reasona-
ble to assume that this is the interpretation the drafters in-
tended. Indeed, in business transactions, the offeror with rare
exception is indifferent as to whether acceptance occurs by
promise or by performance. Insistence on a particular manner
of acceptance is rare. Concern is focused on achieving the
objective of the agreement, namely, the purchase and sale of
goods. Although there has been extensive academic discussion
of the two interpretations, 7 it now appears that the courts have
accepted the broad interpretation. 77
UNAMBIGUOUS OFFERS-MANNER AND MEDIUM
If the language of the offer or surrounding circumstances
unambiguously prescribe a particular manner of acceptance,
the question arises as to when acceptance occurs and whether
notice of acceptance is required. Neither section 2-206 nor other
sections of Article -2 provide principles for resolving these is-
sues, and therefore courts must resort to common law. How-
ever, as observed above, pre-Code rules provided that the of-
feror looked forward to either performance or a promise as ac-
ceptance. It did not recognize the principle that the offeror
could choose not to prescribe manner thereby giving the offeree
the choice to accept in any reasonable manner.
The Code recognizes this principle and in so doing necessi-
tates a redefinition of the principles of acceptance under these
76. Compare W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1964) and Murray, Contracts: A New Design for the Agreement Process, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1968) with 3 M. BENDER, U.C.C. SERVICE § 4.02 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691
(1976); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d
1 (1975); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974).
Some courts do not discuss the interpretation difficulties posed by section 2-206.
They appear unconcerned, however, as to whether acceptance takes the form of a
return promise or performance. These cases suggest that section 2-206(1) (a) has had a
liberalizing effect. See, e.g., Earl-M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 540 P.2d 978
(Hawaii 1975); Austin v. Montgomery, 336 So. 2d 745 (Miss. 1976).
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circumstances. Resort to pre-Code rules to fill the gaps created
by the Code in this area would be fruitless. Fortunately, the
second Restatement adopted, with minor variation, the Code's
scheme of acceptance and has developed principles which may
be applied to those situations the Code fails to address.18
Accordingly, in a sale of goods transaction, if language or
circumstances unambiguously prescribe performance as the
manner of acceptance, section 45 of the second Restatement
applies." This section, which was developed from the first Re-
statement's section 45, retains the traditional principle that
where the offer prescribes performance as the manner of ac-
ceptance, the contract does not come into existence until com-
pletion or tender of the invited performance. However, it pro-
vides that an option contract is created when the offeree tend-
ers or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of
it. The option contract creates an irrevocable offer that binds
only the offeror. The offeree, on the other hand, is not bound
to complete the requested performance. The offeror's duty of
performance created under the option contract is conditional
on completion or tender of the requested performance in ac-
cordance with the terms of the offer.
Section 56 of the second Restatement is applicable for de-
termining under what circumstances notice of acceptance by
performance is required. This section continues the prevailing
common law principles. In other words, notice is not required
unless requested by the offeror, or the offeree has reason to
know that the offeror has no adequate means of learning of the
performance with reasonable promptness and certainty. If the
offeror does not have adequate means, then the contractual
duty of the offeror is discharged unless the offeree exercises
reasonable diligence to notify the offeror, the offeror learns of
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 29, 31, 45, 56, & 63 (1973). It is not
possible to discuss in this article all the differences that exist between the language of
the second Restatement sections and the language of the Code. For an extensive
analysis, see Murray, Contracts: A New Design for the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL
L. REV. 785 (1968).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1973) reads in full as follows:
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance
and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when
the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of
it.
(2) The offeror's duty of performance under any option contract so created
is conditional on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance
with the terms of the offer.
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the performance within a reasonable time, or the offer indicates
that notification of acceptance is not required."'
In the case where a promise is invited as acceptance, the
Code continues the common law principle that the promise
need not be expressed in words. It may be implied from the
conduct of the offeree and even by silence under some circum-
stances." The Code is silent, however, on the question of
whether notice of acceptance is essential to make the accept-
ance effective. The second Restatement does provide that no-
tice is necessary to make such acceptance effective unless the
silence or inaction of the offeree operates as an acceptance or
the offeror dispenses with notice. 2 Pursuant to section 1-103,
these rules will apply to Code transactions as well. The ques-
tion arises whether such notice is operative only upon receipt
by the offeror.
Section 1-201(38) suggests that the Code adopts the com-
mon law mailbox rule for cases where acceptance is to be
mailed or otherwise sent from a distance. Accordingly, if the
offeror has prescribed or surrounding circumstances indicate a
particular medium of acceptance and the offeree complies and
properly addresses the acceptance, it is effective on dispatch
and terminates the offeror's power of revocation. If the accept-
ance is not sent in accordance with the prescribed medium, the
same section provides that the acceptance is nevertheless effec-
tive when sent, provided it is received within the time that a
seasonably dispatched acceptance using the stipulated me-
dium would normally have arrived. The Code principle alters
80. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) might be interpreted to alter this result. That is, it might
be interpreted to apply when performance is prescribed as well as when performance
is chosen as a reasonable medium of acceptance. At least one court appears to have
adopted this interpretation. See Petersen v. Thompson, 264 Or. 516, 506 P.2d 697
(1973). It is submitted that this interpretation is incorrect since the language
"performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance" suggests performance as one alter-
native among others. It does not imply performance as the only mode of acceptance.
81. U.C.C. § 2-204(1). The comment states that the purpose of this subsection is
to continue the common law policy of recognizing any manner of expression of agree-
ment, oral, written or otherwise. The subsection thus incorporates via section 1-103 the
common law rules which establish the circumstances under which silence constitutes
acceptance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 (1973). In addition, this
section has been used extensively in a number of cases and has been interpreted to
apply when conduct constitutes the agreement as well as when conduct evidences a
prior agreement. See, e.g., Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n., 539 F.2d 1249 (1976)
(conduct evidences offer and acceptance); Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co.,
424 F. Supp. 770 (1976) (conduct evidences prior agreement).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 57A (1973).
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the common law principle cited in the first Restatement sec-
tion 68, which provided that under these circumstances the
acceptance was not effective until received.
If, on the other hand, a particular medium is not stipulated
or the offeror merely suggests a medium, section 2-206(1)(a)
expressly adopts the principle that the offer may be accepted
by "any reasonable medium under the circumstances." Ac-
cordingly, if the acceptance is to be mailed or sent from a
distance, and the medium is not prescribed, the acceptance is
effective on dispatch provided the means of transmission is
reasonable. If an unreasonable means is employed, the accept-
ance would nevertheless be effective on dispatch if in accord-
ance with the rule stated in section 1-201(38).
The Code alters the common law rule, which as observed
above, required that the acceptance be dispatched in an au-
thorized manner. The Code's rejection of the common law
"authorization" test appears to be motivated by the drafters'
concern that the test lacked the flexibility needed for business
practice and could not be expanded to apply to new media of
communication."
Determining the moment in time when the acceptance by
promise or by performance is effective is crucial for two rea-
sons. First, it is the point in time when the contract comes into
existence. Second, the acceptance terminates the offeror's
power of revocation. However, as observed above, the power to
revoke may terminate before acceptance occurs. Thus, the par-
ties may create a firm offer by the giving of consideration or
pursuant to section 2-205. In addition, if the offeror prescribes
performance as the manner of acceptance, an option contract
is created pursuant to section 45 of the second Restatement
when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or
tenders a beginning of it. This option contract also terminates
the power of revocation as observed above. In time, the courts
at common law recognized that section 90 of the first Restate-
ment, when applied to offers which induced substantial and
foreseeable reliance in the form of preparations to perform,
would also create an irrevocable offer. 84 The second Restate-
ment approved this use of promissory estoppel and created
83. U.C.C. § 2-206, comment 1.
84. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving, 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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section 89(B)(2)M which states the application of section 90 to
an unaccepted offer. Section 89(B)(2) is applicable to Code
transactions via section 1-103; therefore, offers which prescribe
a manner of acceptance are subject to becoming irrevocable
pursuant to this section. Section 90 continues to be applicable
to other types of cases. 8
As the comments87 to section 89(B)-(2) explain, the section
is chiefly important where the offeree must undergo substantial
expense, forego alternatives, or undertake substantial commit-
ments in order to be in a position to accept. The option created
by section 89(B)(2) differs from the previously mentioned op-
tion contracts in that it does not necessarily result in full scale
enforcement of the contract. 8 The 89(B) (2) option contract is
binding only to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. Thus,
the section contemplates flexibility of remedies depending on
a number of factors, including the formality of the offer, the
degree of fault on the part of the offeror and the relative bar-
gaining position of the parties.89
AMBIGUOUS OFFERS-MANNER AND MEDIUM
If language or circumstances do not unambiguously pre-
scribe the manner or the offeror merely suggests a particular
manner, the Code adopts the rule in section 2-206(1) (a) that
the offeree may choose to accept in any reasonable manner. As
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89B(2) (1973) provides:
(2) An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before accept-
ance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option
contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.
86. Section 90 continues to be applicable to gratuitous promises, including charita-
ble subscriptions and promises to procure insurance.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89B(2), comment e (1973).
88. See text accompanying notes 20-42 and 79, supra.
89. Several recent Article 2 cases illustrate the use of promissory estoppel to bind
the offeror: Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis.
1974) (citing RESTATEMENT § 90); Jenkins & Boiler Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, Inc.,
36 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 344 N.E.2d 275 (1976) (citing RESTATEMENT § 90).
For jurisdictions which accept the second Restatement, section 89B(2) is the appro-
priate section to apply to offers which induce substantial and foreseeable reliance.
Section 89B(2) has several advantages. First, it makes clear that substantial and
foreseeable preparations to perform may be sufficient to create an option contract.
Second, it allows for flexibility of remedies by providing that the option contract is
binding to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. The first Restatements' § 90 does
not expressly provide for such flexibility in that it states that the promise is binding
"if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
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a practical matter, this rule will usually give the offeree the
choice to accept by either performance or promise." Section 2-
206(1)(b) states this rule for contracts which require prompt or
current shipment.9' That is, an offer to buy goods for prompt
or current shipment is interpreted as allowing acceptance by
prompt or current shipment or by a prompt promise to ship.
Even language such as "ship at once" does not normally envis-
age a single manner of acceptance . 2 In addition, section 2-
206(1)(b) reverses the common law rule that a contract comes
into existence only if the goods shipped by the offeree-seller
conformed to the terms of the offer. The common law rule
benefited only the offeree-seller and gave him the opportunity
to perpetrate what was commonly referred to as the "unilateral
contract trick."93 If the seller shipped nonconforming goods and
the offeror-buyer sued for breach of contract, the offeree-seller
could defend on the ground that no contract had been formed.
Pursuant to section 2-206(1)(b) if the goods shipped are non-
conforming the offeree-seller is deemed to have accepted and
to have breached at the same time. However, if the offeree-
seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is in-
tended merely as an accommodation, the shipment does not
operate as an acceptance or as a breach and buyer has no action
for breach of contract.
If the offeree is empowered to choose between acceptance by
promise or by performance, the question arises as to when ac-
ceptance occurs and whether notice of acceptance is required.
The Code does not provide principles of acceptance for the
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 31 (1973). See, e.g., Fender v. Colonial
Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc.,
20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974).
91. "Shipment" is used in section 2-206 in the same sense as in section 2-504.
Unfortunately, the terms "prompt" or "current" are undefined and may create uncer-
tainty as to whether a case falls within the scope of section 2-206(1)(a) or (1)(b). It is
unclear for instance whether the terms "prompt" or "current" were intended to convey
the same meaning or different meanings. In addition, although it appears that the
element of time is the crucial factor in deciding if an offer is for prompt or current
shipment, it is uncertain whether time is also to be considered in light of the transac-
tion, the nature of the industry and the relationship of the parties, including their past
dealings. The term "current," for instance, might be interpreted to require that such
factors be considered.
92. U.C.C. § 2-206, comment 2.
93. See W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
339 (1964).
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case when the offeree chooses to accept by promise. However,
the same rules that apply to the case where a promise is pre-
scribed as the manner of acceptance will apply to this situation
as well. 4 On the other hand, if the offeree elects to accept by
performance and acceptance by performance is reasonable,
section 2-206(2) applies.
Section 2-206(2) provides that the beginning of performance
is acceptance of the contract. 5 The beginning of performance
is construed as assent to the terms of the offer and therefore as
signifying a promise to be bound by its terms. The result is a
bilateral contract to which both parties are bound immedi-
ately."
The section also provides that notice of acceptance must be
given within a reasonable time when the offeree chooses to
accept by performance. If the offeree fails to notify the offeror
within a reasonable time, the offeror may treat the offer as
having lapsed before acceptance. Since an offer can lapse only
if acceptance has not occurred, the statute and accompanying
comments support the view that notice constitutes a part of the
acceptance.97 The view that notice is required upon acceptance
and constitutes a part of the acceptance is consistent with the
94. The Restatement recognizes that the rules which apply when a promise is
prescribed as the manner of acceptance will also apply when a promise is merely
requested. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 57A & 64 (1973).
95. Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-206 observes that the beginning of performance can
be effective as acceptance only if it unambiguously expresses the offeree's intention to
engage himself.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1973) reads:
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to choose between acceptance by prom-
ise and acceptance by performance, the tender of beginning of the invited per-
formance or a tender of a beginning of it is an acceptance by performance.
(2) Such an acceptance operates as a promise to tender complete perform-
ance.
The Restatement also creates a bilateral contract by virtue of the promise con-
tained in section 63(2). However, section 63 adopts a radically different position on
whether notice of acceptance is required.
97. U.C.C. § 2-206, comment 3 provides in part: "lilt is essential that notice
follow in due course to constitute acceptance." Several statements in the comment
appear confusing. These statements read: "Nothing in this section however bars the
possibility that under the common law performance begun may have an intermediate
effect of temporarily barring revocation of the offer, or at the offeror's option, final
effect in constituting acceptance." It is submitted that these statements mean nothing
more than that the offeror may choose to prescribe performance, in which case the start
of performance creates an option contract under § 45 of the second Restatement or he
may choose not to prescribe manner, in which case the start of performance creates
the contract under U.C.C. § 2-206(2).
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
fact that a bilateral contract comes into existence upon the
beginning of performance. Nevertheless, this view has been
criticized and rejected by the second Restatement. The criti-
cism centers on the possibility that under the section an offeror
could revoke the offer after the offeree has started performance
but before he has given notice.18 Such a result is inequitable
and harsh. The second Restatement has adopted the view that
if the offeree chooses to accept by performance, the same rules
for notice apply as when the offeree is required by language or
circumstances to accept by performance. Thus, pursuant to
section 56 of the second Restatement, no notification of accept-
ance by the offeree is necessary unless requested by the offeror
or the offeree has reason to know that the offeror has no ade-
quate means of learning of the performance with reasonable
promptness and certainty.
The Restatement rule is based on the idea that although the
act of performance operates as a return promise, the accept-
ance is to be treated as an acceptance by performance rather
than as an acceptance by promise. Although it has been sug-
gested that the Restatement rules on notice should be applied
to Code transactions when the offeree chooses to accept by
performance, it has been difficult for the courts to ignore the
plain language of the section.9
In the event the offeror is indifferent as to the manner of
acceptance, the acceptance will usually be the event which
terminates the power of revocation. Such power may, however,
terminate at a point earlier in time. Thus, the parties may
create a firm offer by the giving of consideration or pursuant
to section 2-205.
In addition, pursuant to section 89(B) (2) of the second Re-
statement, an ambiguous offer may become irrevocable to the
extent necessary to avoid injustice when the offeree substan-
tially and foreseeably relies on the offer. These methods of
creating option contracts are the same methods that are avail-
98. See Murray, Contracts: A New Design for the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL
L. REv. 785, 796 (1968).
99. See, e.g., Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
where the court observed that even assuming arguendo that an offer had materialized,
the offeree who had started to perform had failed to give notice of acceptance as
required under section 2-206(2)(b). See also Stockard v. Vernon Co., 9 UCC Rep. Serv.
1067 (Okla. App. 1971) (notice of acceptance pursuant to subsection 2-206(2) given by
offeree).
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able in the event the offeror prescribes a particular manner of
acceptance.100
ACCEPTANCE OR COUNTEROFFER-SECTION 2-207
One of the most troublesome rules at common law was that
a response to an offer which did not mirror or correspond ex-
actly to the terms of the offer was a counteroffer and therefore
ineffective to create a contract.'" The rule was particularly
harsh for large commercial enterprises which frequently con-
cluded business transactions by means of printed forms. It was
not unusual that these printed forms did not mirror each
other's terms and even though the parties to the transaction
were of the opinion that they were bound by a contractual
relationship, there was in fact no contract.1 12 Section 2-207 was
created to remedy this situation."3 This section is intended to
100. The option contract created pursuant to § 45 of the second Restatement is not
available under these circumstances, however, since this section applies only in the
event that the offeror prescribes performance as the manner of acceptance.
* 101. This principle was sometimes called the "mirror image rule." See, e.g., Roun-
saville v. Van Zandt Realtors, Inc., 247 Ark. 749, 447 S.W.2d 655 (1969); Shell Oil Co.
v. Kelinson, 158 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1968); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216
N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915). Some courts avoided the application of the rule by
holding that the additional or different statement contained in the acceptance would
have been implied in fact from the offer. See, e.g., Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 9 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1925).
102. Section 2-207 is intended to avoid this result and to give effect to the intention
of the parties. Comment 2 observes, "Under this Article a proposed deal which in
commercial understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract."
103. Section 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, to-
gether with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this Act.
The cases and law review commentaries are cited and discussed in Barron & Dun-
fee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLov. ST. L. REv. 171
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apply to any situation where the response to an offer does not
conform exactly to the terms of the offer and regardless of
whether one or both parties is a merchant.
The comments' suggest that the section was intended to
apply primarily to two typical situations. The first occurs when
the parties have entered into an agreement either orally or by
informal correspondence and subsequently, one or both parties
sends a formal memorandum which includes the terms agreed
upon but adds terms not previously discussed. The second situ-
ation occurs when a written response to an offer which is ex-
pressed and intended as an acceptance adds further minor
suggestions or proposals, such as "Ship by Tuesday" or "rush."
Under these circumstances, section 2-207 applies for the pur-
pose of determining whether a contract has come into existence
and, if so, what the terms of the contract are.
In determining whether there is a contract, section 2-207(1)
provides that an expression of acceptance operates as an ac-
ceptance and thereby creates a contract, even though the ex-
pression contains different or additional terms. That is, the
inclusion of different or additional terms in a response does not
necessarily create a counteroffer. To operate as an acceptance,
the expression must be definite and seasonable and not condi-
tional on assent to the new or different terms. In other words,
if the response objectively manifests an intent to accept in
accordance with common law and Code principles outlined
above and if it is not expressly conditional, the response consti-
tutes an acceptance and a contract based on the terms origi-
nally agreed upon results.
Whether the additional terms included in the response be-
come part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of
section 2-207(2). Section 2-207(2) provides that the addi-
tional' 5 terms are to be construed as proposals for additions to
(1975). See also Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1975); Dorton
v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Doughboy Indus., Inc.,
17 App. Div.2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962); W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE
TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1964); 3 M. BENDER, U.C.C. SERVICE (1975); WHITE
& SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1974).
White & Summers compare section 2-207 to "the amphibious tank that was originally
designed to fight in the swamps but which was ultimately sent to fight in the desert."
Id. at 24.
104. U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 1.
105. There has been extensive debate as to whether section, 2-207 (2) includes
"different" as well as "additional" terms. Subsection (1) uses both terms while subsec-
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the contract. In transactions involving only one merchant or
between consumers, such proposals do not become part of the
contract unless separately agreed to by the parties. On the
other hand, in transactions between merchants, the proposals
become part of the contract unless the offer expressly limits
acceptance to the terms of the offer,' 6 the proposals materially
alter the contract, 7 or notification of objection to the proposals
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time
after notice of them is received.
tion (2) uses only the word "additional."
Comment 3 suggests that the drafters intended that both additional and different
terms were to be included. For a list of cases in which the issue is discussed, see Barron
& Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEv. ST. L. REv.
171, 187 (1975).
106. For cases applying 2-207(2) (a), see In re Waterlily Juniors, Inc., 19 UCC Rep.
Serv. 86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Tunis Mfg. Corp., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 544 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1972).
107. The term "material" is not defined in the Code. However, comment 4 to
U.C.C. § 2-207 provides examples of clauses which are material. It reads,
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter" the
contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express
awareness by the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties
as that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances
in which either warranty normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of
90% or 100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery, where the usage
of the trade allows greater quantity leeways; a clause reserving to the seller the
power to cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any invoice when due; a clause
requiring that complaints be made in a time materially shorter than customary
or reasonable.
Comment 5 offers examples of clauses which are not material. It states,
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and
which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection
is seasonably given are: a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly
upon the seller's exemption due to supervening clauses beyond his control,
similar to those covered by the provision of this Article on merchant's excuse
by failure of presupposed conditions or a clause fixing in advance any reasonable
formula of proration under such circumstances; a clause fixing a reasonable time
for complaints within customary limits, or in the case of a purchase for subsale,
providing for inspection by the sub-purchaser; a clause providing for interest on
overdue invoices or fixing the seller's standard credit terms where they are
within the range of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; a
clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall within the customary
trade tolerances for acceptance "with adjustment" or otherwise limiting remedy
in a reasonable manner (see Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
For a criticism of the Code's examples, see 3 M. BENDER, U.C.C.SERvIcE § 3.03(1)
(1975). The question of whether the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the response
to an offer constitutes a material variance has been extensively litigated. Such a clause
is not mentioned in either comment 4 or comment 5. Compare Gaynor-Stafford Indus.
v. Mafco Textured Fibers, 52 App. Div. 2d 481, 384 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1976) (arbitration
clause not a material variance) with In re Barclay Knitwear Co., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 44
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (arbitration clause is a material variance).
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The question arises as to whether section 2-207(1) abolishes
the common law counteroffer. The answer is in the negative.
A counteroffer may still be created in one of several ways.
Subsection (1) of section 2-207 provides that the offeree may
expressly condition the acceptance on assent to the additional
terms. A response containing such a condition is in effect a
counteroffer. 08 A counteroffer may also be created under sec-
tion 2-207(1) in the absence of such a condition where the re-
sponse fails to manifest an intent to accept and therefore does
not qualify as a definite and seasonable expression of accept-
ance.
109
In the event the exchanged writings do not establish a con-
tract under section 2-207(1), as in the case where the accept-
ance constitutes a counteroffer, but there is conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of a contract, section 2-
207(3) applies. This section provides that the terms of the con-
tract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under other sections of Article 2.110
CONCLUSION
The principles of offer and acceptance that apply to trans-
actions for the sale of goods are derived from two sources: the
common law, including the second Restatemeit, and Article 2.
As observed, Article 2 preserves many common law rules that
were thought by the drafters to be consistent with business
practice and custom. However, some pre-Code rules were
thought to be inconsistent, and were therefore changed. In
some cases the pre-existing law was radically altered.
The consequence is that the lawyer must know two sets of
rules. However, mere knowledge of the common law and Code
108. There has been debate over the question of what language qualifies to make
the acceptance expressly conditional on the offeror's assent. Compare Dorton v. Collins
& Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) with Roto-lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett &
Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
109. For a discussion on the issue of when a response fails to manifest intent to
accept, see WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-2 (1972).
110. For a discussion of section 2-207(3) see Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453
F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) (dicta); Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins,
Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969) (dicta); Falcon
Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Worthington Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 355 A.2d 898
(Del. Super. 1976) (dicta). For a discussion of the reluctance of the courts to apply
section 2-207(3) directly, see Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflec-
tion and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 171, 196 (1975).
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principles is insufficient. The lawyer must know how to inte-
grate the common law with the Code. Attorneys must realize
that in certain instances it is consistent with Code principles
to use either pre-Code or post-Code common law rules to sup-
plement the Code while in other instances, it is necessary to
supplement with rules created after the Code was adopted and
stated if the second Restatement. Only when the Code is pro-
perly supplemented does it provide complete and integrated
principles of offer and acceptance for the formation of the sales
contract.
Despite its obvious shortcomings, the Code generally has
had a liberalizing effect on the principles governing the forma-
tion of the sales contract. This effect will continue as long as
the lawyer approaches Article 2 with an understanding of its
purposes and its relationship to common law.

